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Abstract
Proponents of Neuro-Linguistic Programming (NLP) claim that certain eye-movements are reliable indicators of lying.
According to this notion, a person looking up to their right suggests a lie whereas looking up to their left is indicative of
truth telling. Despite widespread belief in this claim, no previous research has examined its validity. In Study 1 the eye
movements of participants who were lying or telling the truth were coded, but did not match the NLP patterning. In Study 2
one group of participants were told about the NLP eye-movement hypothesis whilst a second control group were not. Both
groups then undertook a lie detection test. No significant differences emerged between the two groups. Study 3 involved
coding the eye movements of both liars and truth tellers taking part in high profile press conferences. Once again, no
significant differences were discovered. Taken together the results of the three studies fail to support the claims of NLP. The
theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.
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Introduction
Psychologists have carried out a great deal of research in an
attempt to establish the behavioural correlates of lying [1], [2].
However, despite this impressive catalogue of work, no previous
research has properly examined the validity of a notion that has
received widespread acceptance among the public, namely that
liars tend to exhibit a particular pattern of eye movement.
Neuro-Linguistic Programming (NLP) consists of a diverse
collection of psychological techniques that aim to enhance peoples’
lives [3]. An important aspect of the work involves attempting to
improve people’s communication skills by teaching them about an
alleged relationship between eye-movements and thought. Ac-
cording to this work, when right-handed people look up to their
right they are likely to be visualising a ‘constructed’ (i.e., imagined)
event, whilst when they look up to their left they likely to be
visualising a ‘remembered’ memory (i.e., an event that has actually
happened to them) (see Figure 1). In contrast, when they look to
their right they are likely to be thinking about a ‘constructed’
sound, and when they look to their left they are likely to be
thinking of a ‘remembered’ sound. These alleged relationships are
frequently taught in NLP training courses [4], and are ubiquitous
on the internet. Indeed, a Google search on the terms ‘neuro-
linguistic programming’ reveals thousands of sites describing the
alleged relationship, and two well known YouTube videos
encouraging lie detectors to adopt this approach have received
30,000 and 60,000 views respectively.
Throughout the 1980s researchers examined many of the claims
made by NLP practitioners [5], [6]. Much of this work assessed the
alleged relationship between eye-movement and modality of
thought, and involved recording participants’ eye-movements
whilst asking them questions that encouraged to recall visual and
auditory memories (e.g., ‘What colour is the front door of your
house?’, ‘Can you describe the sound of your mother’s voice?’).
This work consistently failed to support the claims of NLP [7], [8],
[9].
Although the originators of NLP didn’t view ‘constructed’
thoughts as lies, this notion has become commonplace, leading
many NLP practitioners to claim that it is possible to gain a useful
insight into whether someone is lying from their eye-movements
[10]. Unfortunately, very little, if any, previous work has examined
the validity of this claim. Rhoads and Solomon [11] briefly refer to
four experiments that allegedly demonstrated that the technique
could be used to accurately classify 90% of truths and lies, but do
not provide a reference for these experiments. Vrij and Lochun
[12] were rightly skeptical about these alleged studies, noting that
Figure 1. The alleged relationship between eye-movements
and thinking (seen from the observer’s point of view).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0040259.g001
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no other experiment into the psychology of lie detection has
yielded this level of accuracy.
The three studies reported here provide the first experimental
examination of the alleged relationship between lying and the
pattern of eye-movements proposed by many NLP practitioners.
Study 1 involved filming participants lying and telling the truth,
and then coding their eye movements. On the basis of the claims
made by many NLP practitioners, it was predicted that
participants would be significantly more likely to look up to their
right when they were lying compared to when they were telling the
truth, and that they would be significantly more likely to look up to
their left when they were telling the truth compared to when they
were lying.
Experiment 1
Method
Design. The project was approved by University of Edin-
burgh Psychology Research Ethics Committee (PREC), and
written consent was obtained from all participants. This study
employed a within design involving two conditions. In each
condition participants carried out a series of actions and then took
part in a videotaped interview about their behaviour. In one
condition participants were asked to tell the truth, whilst in the
other condition they were asked to lie. As the NLP literature does
not specify what duration of eye-movements are considered
informative, the study investigated both short and longer duration
movements. The dependent variables were the frequency of
participants’ gazes (i.e., eye-movements that lasted one second or
more) and glances (eye-movements under one second in duration)
to the upper right or upper left direction during the interview.
Participants. The 32 participants (12 male, average age
22.3, range 18–56 years) were primarily undergraduate students
recruited through contacts of the experimenters. As the NLP
literature suggests that the alleged relationship between lying and
eye-movement is strongest in right handed people, participants
were only recruited if they described themselves as right handed.
Participants were told that the study concerned the psychology of
lying, but were not informed that it involved studying eye-
movement. Participants were not compensated for their involve-
ment in the study.
Materials. Edinburgh Handedness Inventory [13]. This ten-
item questionnaire asks respondents to indicate their preferred
hand for using an everyday object (e.g., toothbrush). Responses are
scored to give a Laterality Quotient (LQ) that has a range of
possible scoring from 2100 to +100. A negative score indicates a
left-handed preference, and a positive score indicates a right-
handed preference.
Procedure. Participants were tested individually. Each par-
ticipant arrived at a briefing room and completed the Edinburgh
Handedness Inventory. The order in which they then completed
the ‘Lie’ and ‘Truth’ condition was randomly determined by a
coin toss.
In the ‘Lie’ condition the participant was first given the
experimenter’s mobile telephone. They were then instructed to go
into a certain office, hide the telephone in their pocket or bag, and
return to the briefing room. The experimenter explained that they
would be taken to an interview room and filmed answering three
questions: ‘What did you do inside the office?’, ‘What objects did
you see in the desk drawer?’, and ‘What was the layout of the
objects in the drawer?’. When asked what they did inside the
office, the participant was asked to lie, and say that they opened
the desk drawer and put the phone inside it. When asked what
objects they saw in the drawer, the participant was asked to
describe five plausible objects (‘plausible’ was defined as something
small enough to fit and that might be seen in a desk drawer.) When
asked to describe the layout of the objects, the participant was
asked to give a fictional description. The participant was asked to
be as convincing as possible throughout the interview.
The participant completed this task and was then taken to the
interview room and interviewed by a second experimenter who
was unaware of whether the participant was lying or telling the
truth. During the interview the participant sat in front of a black
background with the camera focused on the participant’s face in
order that their eye-movements were clearly recorded.
In the ‘Truth’ condition the participant was given the
experimenter’s mobile telephone, and instructed to go to a certain
office, open the top drawer of the desk in the office, place the
telephone inside the drawer, look at the other objects inside the
drawer and then return to the briefing room. The experimenter
explained that they would then be taken to an interview room and
filmed answering three questions: ‘What did you do inside the
office?’, ‘What objects did you see in the desk drawer?’, and ‘What
was the layout of the objects in the drawer?’. The participant was
asked to tell the truth throughout the interview. The participant
completed the task and was then taken to the interview room and
interviewed by a second experimenter.
The contents of the office desk drawer for each trial were
randomly chosen from a pool of thirty everyday objects (e.g.,
stapler, apple, calculator, small umbrella, envelope).
Coding of interviews. Each of the 64 interviews (i.e., two
interviews per participant) were coded by two independent raters.
To ensure that the raters were not influenced by the participants’
comments during the interviews, the audio tracks were removed
prior to coding. The coding involved counting the number of
times the participant looked and up to the right, and up to the left,
during each interview. Figure 2 depicts the two areas into which
eye-movements had to fall to be coded as Upper Right (UR) or
Upper Left (UL). Eye-movements in other directions (e.g. directly
upwards or downwards) were not coded. To help ensure high
inter-rater reliability, the raters were trained on four ‘test’
interviews that were filmed in addition to the participant
interviews. One of the raters was unaware of condition allocation.
The other was blind to condition allocation for 24 participants, but
had conducted the interviewing for the remaining 8 participants
and therefore may have been able to remember which were lies
and truths. The Intraclass Correlation Coefficient for these 8
participants was 0.92 (p,0.001) vs 0.87 (p,0.001) for the 24
remaining participants. As there was little difference between these
figures, there is no evidence that possible non-blind rating affected
agreement between the coding.
The two raters watched each interview repeatedly at both
normal and slow speed, and counted the number of times the
participant looked UR for a second or longer, UL for a second or
longer, UR for less than a second and UL for less than a second.
Each of these values was then divided by the duration of the
interview (in seconds) to create four frequency variables: UR gazes,
UL gazes, UR glances, and UL glances.
For the 32 sessions, the Single Measures Intraclass Correlation
Coefficient was 0.89 (p,0.001; N= 256), indicating a high level of
agreement between the raters. Ratings were therefore combined
for analysis.
Results
The mean Laterality Quotient was 75.0 (SD=22.9;
range = 14.0–100.0), confirming that all participants were right-
handed.
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The amount of time taken for participants to give truthful
answers versus deceptive answers was not significantly different
(Truth mean= 43.8 seconds, SD=19.5; Lie mean= 42.6 seconds,
SD=17.5; Related t-test (31) = 0.75, p(2-t) = 0.46).
The means and standard deviations for each of the eye-
movements are shown in Table 1, along with the results of related
t-tests comparing the Lie and Truth conditions. None of the
analyses were significant.
Discussion
Many NLP practitioners claim that a person’s eye-movements
can reveal a useful insight into whether they are lying or telling the
truth. According to this notion, looking up to the right is indicative
of lying whereas looking up to their left suggests that they are
telling the truth. Study 1 tested both of these hypotheses but failed
to find support for either notion.
It could be argued that the study lacked ecological validity
because NLP practitioners do not advocate that lie detection
involves the careful coding of filmed interviews, but instead
promotes a more intuitive and holistic process based on the real
time observation of behaviour. Study 2 tackled this issue by
informing one group of participants about the eye-movements that
NLP practitioners claim to be associated with lying, and then
asking them to watch the interviews from Study 1 and classify each
as either a lie or the truth. It was hypothesised that participants in
this ‘NLP training’ group would outperform a group of control
participants that had not received such training.
Second, assuming there is no relationship between the proposed
patterns of eye-movements and lying, why should people come to
believe that such a pattern exists? One possibility is that people are
more confident in their lie detection abilities when they believe
that they are following a scientific theoretical framework, such as
that seemingly provided by NLP. Study 2 also addressed this
question by asking participants in the ‘NLP-training’ and ‘control’
conditions to rate how confident they were about their
judgements. It was hypothesised that the ‘NLP training’ group
would produce significantly higher confidence levels than those in
the ‘control’ group.
Experiment 2
Method
Design. The project was approved by University of Hertford-
shire Psychology Research Ethics Committee, and written consent
was obtained from all participants. This study employed a
between-subjects design. Participants were randomly allocated to
one of two groups. Participants in one of the groups were told
about the pattern of eye-movement that NLP practitioners believe
to be associated with lying (‘NLP training’ condition), while
participants in the other group were not given this information
(‘control’ condition). All participants were then asked to watch
interviews from Study 1, indicate whether they thought the
interviewee was lying or telling the truth, and rate how confident
they were about their decision.
Participants. The 50 participants (16 male, average age
26.62 years, range 18–73) were recruited through contacts of the
experimenters. Participants were told that the study concerned the
psychology of lying, and were not compensated for their
involvement in the study.
Materials. 1. Interviews: each participant judged only the
first of each pair of interviews that had been recorded for Study 1.
2. NLP training sheet: this described the patterns of eye-movement
that NLP practitioners believe to be associated with lying, and
provided a clear illustration of what they should be looking for
during the lie detection task. 3. Response sheet: this asked
participants to indicate whether they thought each interviewee was
telling the truth or lying, and rate the degree of confidence in their
answer on a scale between 1 (not at all confident) and 7 (very
confident).
Procedure. All participants were tested individually. Partic-
ipants were randomly assigned to either the ‘NLP training’ or
‘control’ condition. Participants in the ‘NLP training’ condition
were given the NLP information sheet and asked to read it. The
experimenter then answered any questions they had about the
information presented on the sheet, and ensured that they
Figure 2. The areas of eye-movements classified as Upper Left
and Upper Right (seen from the coder’s point of view).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0040259.g002
Table 1. The mean frequencies (per second, SD in parentheses), related t-tests and p-values comparing of UL and UR gazes and
glances in the Truth and Lie conditions.
Truth condition Lie condition Related t-value (df = 31)
p-value
(2-t)
UL gazes 0.012 (0.028) 0.007 (0.016) 21.60 0.12
UL glances 0.040 (0.048) 0.029 (0.035) 21.77 0.09
UR gazes 0.019 (0.027) 0.017 (0.023) 20.35 0.73
UR glances 0.044 (0.035) 0.047 (0.033) 0.37 0.71
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0040259.t001
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understood patterns of eye-movement that NLP practitioners
believe to be associated with lying. All participants were then
shown the 32 video clips. After seeing each clip the participant was
asked to indicate whether they believed the interviewee was lying
or telling the truth, and indicate how confident they were about
their decision, on the response sheet. The experimenters were
blind to whether the clip being rated was the truth or a lie.
Results
The means and standard deviations for the lie detection task
and confidence ratings are shown in Table 2, along with the results
of unrelated t-tests comparing the ‘NLP-training’ and ‘control’
conditions. None of the analyses was significant.
Discussion
Study 1 involved the fine-grained analysis of videotapes of liars
and truth tellers, and failed to find support for claims frequently
made by some NLP practitioners, namely that people tend to look
up to their right when they lie and up to their left when they tell
the truth. Study 2 represented a more ecologically valid test of this
notion by examining the lie detection skills of people who had
been informed about the alleged relationship between lying and
eye movements. The study involved two groups of participants,
with one group being told about the pattern of eye-movement that
NLP practitioners believe to be associated with lying, while the
other group were not given this information. Both groups were
then asked to watch interviews from Study 1, indicate whether
they thought the interviewee was lying or telling the truth, and rate
how confident they were about their decision. The results revealed
no difference between the accuracy levels, and confidence ratings,
of the two groups and so again provided no support for the claims
relating to NLP and lie detection.
The majority of psychological studies exploring lying have
employed the type of ‘low-stakes’ task used in Studies 1 and 2 [14].
During these tasks people are not punished for failing to tell a
convincing lie, and so participants may not be especially motivated
to perform well. In everyday life this is often not the case, causing
some researchers to argue that laboratory-based lie detection
research lacks ecological validity. Study 3 addressed this issue by
examining whether the alleged relationship between lying and eye
movements emerged in a series of videos containing high stakes
lies.
The study utilized a large international sample of videotapes
containing footage of people making a public appeal for a missing
relative [15]. In approximately half of these cases there exists
overwhelming evidence suggesting that the person making the
appeal was lying, whilst in the remaining cases the evidence
suggests that the appeal was genuine. Previous coding of these
tapes has revealed several important differences in the verbal and
nonverbal behaviour of liars and truth-tellers, with, for example,
liars using fewer words, more tentative words (e.g., ‘if’, ‘perhaps’,
‘maybe’), and blinking more [15].
On the basis of the claims made by many NLP practitioners, it
was predicted that those lying at the press conferences would be
significantly more likely to look up to their right than those telling
the truth.
Experiment 3
Method
Design. The project involved coding the eye movements
made by participants in two types of videos. In one set of videos
there was convincing evidence that the participants were lying
whilst in the other set of videos the evidence strongly suggested
that they were telling the truth. As before, the study investigated
both short and longer duration of eye movements to the upper
right and upper left. The dependent variables were the frequency
of participants’ gazes (i.e., eye-movements that lasted one second
or more) and glances (eye-movements under one second in
duration) to the upper right or upper left direction during the
interview.
Videos. The video archive compiled by ten Brinke and Porter
[15] contains 52 videos in which individuals make a direct public
plea for the safe return of a missing relative. These videos have
been gathered from news agencies in several countries, including
Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States.
There is compelling evidence (including, for example, possession
of the murder weapon, security camera footage, the person leading
police to the victim’s body, the relative being later found alive with
abductor, or the relative having committed suicide) to strongly
suggest that the individuals in 26 of these videos were lying and
that those in the other 26 videos were telling the truth.
Coding. Each of the videotapes was coded by two indepen-
dent raters. The coding procedure was identical to that employed
in Study 1, and involved counting the number of times the
participant looked up and to the right, and up to the left, during
each interview. One coder analysed all of the videos whilst a
second coder examined a random selection of 13 videos to assess
inter-rater reliability. The inter-rater correlation coefficient was
0.85 (p,.0001; N= 52), indicating a high level of agreement
between the raters. The data provided by the first rater was
therefore used for the analysis.
Results
The duration of the videos containing lies was significantly
shorter than the videos containing truth telling (Truth
mean=18.37 seconds, SD=15.70; Lie mean= 10.89 seconds,
SD=8.83; Related t-test (50) = 2.12, p(2-t) = 0.04). There were no
instances of UR gazes or UL gazes. The means and standard
deviations for the frequency (per second) of UR glances and UL
glances are shown in Table 3, along with the results of related t-
tests comparing the Lie and Truth conditions. Neither of the
analyses was significant.
Table 2. Number of correct judgements (MCE= 16) in Truth and Lie conditions.
NLP-training condition
(N=21) Control condition (N=29) Unrelated t-value (48) p-value (2-t)
Mean correct 16.33 (3.53) 16.59 (3.84) 2.24 .81
Mean confidence 4.65 (.44) 4.58 (.50) .43 .67
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0040259.t002
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Discussion
Experiment 1 tested an alleged method of lie detection
promoted by many NLP practitioners. According to this notion,
looking up to the observer’s left is indicative of lying, and looking
up to the right signals truth telling. Participants were filmed lying
and telling the truth, and coders rated each of the videos for the
alleged pattern of eye-movements. The results provided no
support for the existence of such patterns.
Experiment 2 involved informing one group of participants
about the alleged patterns of eye movements associated with lying,
and having them carry out a lie detection task. The results
revealed no significant difference in accuracy between these
‘trained’ participants and those in a control condition that had not
received such training. In addition, those that had received the
NLP training were no more confident in their judgements. As with
much laboratory-based lie detection research, it could be argued
that the task used to generate the interviews lacked ecological
validity. The lies were sanctioned by the experimenter, the task
was relatively trivial, and there was no motivation for the
participants to produce convincing falsehoods.
Experiment 3 was designed to overcome this problem and
involved coding the behaviour of known liars and truth tellers in a
high stakes public setting. Once again, the data did not support the
claims made by NLP practitioners.
In short, all three studies provided no evidence to support the
notion that the patterns of eye-movements promoted by many
NLP practitioners aid lie detection. This is in line with findings
from a considerable amount of previous work showing that facial
clues (including eye movements) are poor indicators of deception
[2]. Future research could focus on why the belief has become so
widespread. Study 2 assessed the possibility that those who have
been told about the claimed relationship between eye-movements
and lying feel especially confident in their ability to detect
deception, but this hypothesis was not supported by the data. An
alternative possibility is that people believe the eye-movement/
lying relationship because they are prone to illusory correlations.
According to this idea, people will be likely to remember the times
that the pattern predicted lying or truth-telling, and forget
instances when this was not the case [16], [17]. Future work
could examine this hypothesis by examining whether such matches
are indeed especially memorable.
This work is the first to experimentally test the claims made by
NLP practitioners about lie detection. The results provide
considerable grounds to be skeptical of the notion that the
proposed patterns of eye-movements provide a reliable indicator of
lying. As such, it would seem irresponsible for such practitioners to
continue to encourage people to make important decisions on the
basis of such claims.
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